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economy.  
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Building a Client State in Iran (Cornell University Press, 1991). 
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and the United States (Yale University Press, 1990) and 
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Syracuse University Press, 2004). He has also published more 
than 40 scholarly articles.  
Gasiorowski is the current recipient of an Award to Louisiana 
Artists and Scholars (ATLAS) grant. He was a Visiting Fellow at 
the Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford 
in 2001-02, and a Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law and 
Political Science, Tehran University, in 1994, 1996, and 1998. He 
has also received grants from the U.S. Institute of Peace, the 
National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National 
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During the past decade, Iran witnessed the promising rise and 
ultimate demise of a pro-democracy movement. This movement 
elected its candidate to the presidency, won a majority of seats 
in the legislature, but failed to bring about meaningful political 
and social change.  
Why did Iran's pro-democracy movement fail? Mark Gasiorowski, 
director of the International Studies Program at Louisiana State 
University, argues the movement failed because its leaders opted 
to pursue incremental, gradual change from within rather than 
directly confronting the Islamic regime. They did not undertake 
an active mobilization strategy, but instead sought political 
liberalization and greater cultural openness while working within 
the system. The failure of Iran's pro-democracy movement has 
important implications not only for the prospects for democracy 
in Iran, but democratization more broadly.  
The reformist movement in Iran consisted of a faction of Iran's 
Islamist ruling elite that had been key and quite radical players in 
the Islamic revolution and then in the Islamic regime itself, but 
subsequently undergone a transition. As they became dissatisfied 
with various negative effects of the revolution, this faction 
embraced democracy as their central goal. Many of them were 
intellectuals and university-educated activists.  
During its first few years, Gasiorowski said, the reformist 
movement was very dynamic. Mohammad Khatami won 69 
percent of the vote in 1997 presidential elections, giving the 
reformists a broad, clear mandate. This was reinforced by 
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 subsequent reformist victories in local and national elections. 
These landslide victories put reformists in control of both the 
legislature and presidency, and momentum was clearly on their 
side.  
However, things began to change after the 2000 parliamentary 
election. The conservative reaction to reformist victory and 
gathering momentum for political change was to adopt a tough 
anti-reformist position. Meanwhile, reformists failed to mobilize 
their supporters in the streets when they had the chance to effect 
real change. Instead, they let the conservative old guard engage 
in a campaign of repression. Reformist newspapers were closed, 
demonstrations were clamped down on, political freedoms were 
curtailed, and many reformist leaders were arrested in a 
campaign to prevent regime change in Iran.  
Why was the reformist reaction to this repression so passive? 
Gasiorowski believes that pro-democracy activists feared a 
confrontational approach would be counterproductive and lead 
only to even more repression. However, he argued, this passive 
approach was also unproductive. Actively opposing the 
conservative clampdown might not have worked, but the 
reformists still could have put their great popularity to effective 
use.  
The conservative clampdown was followed by a string of election 
losses for the reformists. Most of the electorate who favored 
political liberalization seems to have been disillusioned by the 
inability of reformist politicians to bring about change, that is, to 
keep their promises. As a result, both the presidency and the 
legislative majority were taken over by conservatives. This was 
not because the conservatives became more popular, 
Gasiorowski said, but because people lost faith in the ability of 
reformists and stayed away from the election booths.  
The failure of the democracy movement in Iran is particularly 
unfortunate, Gasiorowski argues, because most of the social, 
historical, and cultural prerequisites that social scientists cite for 
democracy were strong in the country at the time Khatami came 
to power. First, Iran is a fairly well-developed, middle-income 
country. Second, Iran does not have endemic ethnic, religious, or 
class conflicts that tend to make democratization difficult. 
However, it must be noted that the potential for division along 
these lines clearly exists, and this is one reason reformist leaders 
were timid in mobilizing people against the regime. Third, Iran 
has a long history of pro-democracy activism, and short but 
repeated periods of constitutional rule.  
Fourth, Gasiorowski argues, Iran also has a religious advantage. 
Though many people these days see Islam as a poor or even 
hostile climate for democracy, Gasiorowski points out that the 
Shi'a branch has strong pluralistic traditions. Multiplicity of 
leaders and efforts at consensus-building have been the norm 
among Shi'a clergy, a feature that has deeply affected the 
character of Iran's Islamic regime. Finally, the democracy 
movement in Iran burgeoned against a backdrop of an extensive 
democratization throughout the world. Many totalitarian and 
authoritarian regimes near Iran were swept away, and the 
momentum was thus clearly on the side of democratization in the 
1990s.  
Despite the conducive setting for democracy in Iran in the late 
1990s, Gasiorowski said, reformists could not succeed. Islamists 
themselves have always displayed a mixture of authoritarian and 
democratic tendencies. One factor conducive to authoritarian rule 
in Iran is its powerful, intrusive state apparatus, which effectively 
prevents and suppresses unrest. Though Iran is not highly 
repressive, the fear of repression discourages people from 
actively seeking political change. Iran also has a powerful 
security apparatus that is loyal to Islamic leaders and effectively 
prevents and if necessary, suppresses unrest.  
Another factor is Iran's oil revenues, which allow the 
conservatives to finance extensive consumer subsidies that help 
reduce the potential for unrest. Oil revenues also help obviate the 
need for taxes, which means the state does not have to be highly 
accountable to society, and society has little room to demand 
political change from the state.  
In the end, Gasiorowski argues, the pro-democracy movement in 
Iran failed because it chose to work within the system. Iran's 
main elected offices proved to be institutionally weak venues for 
bringing about the change that was sought. Unelected bodies 
such as the Supreme Leader and Council in Iran control key 
institutions as the security forces and the judiciary. The latter 
were effectively used by the conservatives to neutralize the 
reformists and contain their supporters. Once Iranians realized 
that the reformists were not able to overcome these obstacles, 
they began to perceive the pro-democracy movement as weak 
and ineffective. It was not long before reformist leaders lost 
credibility and support, and eventually were voted out of office.  
s a result, Gasiorowski argues, the prospects for democracy in 
Iran are now quite bleak. It is clear that the reformist strategy of 
"active calm” rather than a more confrontational approach to 
break the hold of key state institutions held by their conservative 
opponents was an ineffective way to bring about political change 
in the Islamic Republic.  
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